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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001286

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STATE FPR NEA/FO DAS GRAY  
NEA/ARP TREUTER, ABAGWELL  
PM/FO AA/S MULL, PM/RSAT RROBINSON;  
T A/S ROOD;  
P HMUSTAFA;  
DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG, DAS KIMMITT  
CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY  
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, MDORAN, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PTER](#) [MOPS](#) [MASS](#) [KNNP](#) [IR](#) [AE](#)  
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ARMS SALES: STRENGTHENING UAE DEFENSIVE  
CAPABILITIES

REF: ABU DHABI 1161

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison  
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (S) Summary. On July 31 Ambassador met with DCM, USLO Chief, and DATT to review UAE top priorities for upcoming potential military sales under the framework of the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD). We discussed which of the proposed systems would be most feasible both to enhance UAE capacity for self defense and also to increase interoperability with U.S. systems in responding to threats to regional stability. While the acquisition priorities voiced by the UAEG (paragraph 2) do not exactly match Post's review of the most realistically achievable FMS package (paragraph 3), the UAE has expressed interest in purchasing all/all the systems on Post's list, including strong interest in our top priority, the sale of 12 Patriot PAC3/GEM-T batteries valued at \$5.5 billion. End Summary.

12. (S/NF) At the present time, the UAE has expressed interest in purchasing the following potentially offensive and defensive weapons systems (in estimated order of UAE priority):

- a) Armed Predator B (we note MTCR issues);
- b) THAAD/ER-THAAD (est. case value \$1.5-3.9 billion), and investment in the development of ER-THAAD (investment amounts as high as \$1 billion have been mentioned);
- c) SLAMRAAM (to upgrade/replace HAWK missiles) (est. case value \$400-700 million);
- d) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T (est. case value \$5.5 billion);
- e) AVENGER/STINGER missiles vehicle/ship (mounted) (est. case value \$200-300 million);
- f) Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) E2-C Hawkeye (lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an interim fix until AEW&C platform delivered)(est. case value \$150-200 million);
- g) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman

E2-D "Hawkeye") (est. case value \$1.5-2.0 billion for aircraft plus a 20 year follow on support contract est. at \$1 billion);

h) Maritime surveillance aircraft (est. case value \$100-200 million); and

i) Command and control upgrades (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 11/16, GCCS-M) (est. case value depends on which platforms LINK 11/16 are integrated on, such as F-16 block 60s, AEW&C, etc.).

¶3. (S/NF) Post believes that a more realistic, suitable and achievable priority order listing would focus on improved air and missile defense, including shared and interoperable early warning systems. These systems, specifically tailored towards enhancing UAE defensive capabilities, would be (in Post's priority order):

a) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T;

b) SLAMRAAM;

c) AEW&C E2-C Hawkeye (lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an interim fix until AEW&C platform delivered);

d) THAAD/ER-THAAD;

e) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman E2-D "Hawkeye"); and

f) C2 and early warning (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 16 release in specific, etc.).

¶4. (S/NF) The UAEG has made clear that it would like to have

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the Patriot PAC3 and SLAMRAAM systems in place by summer 2009 (reftel). This timetable is overly optimistic. We, and our defense contractor contacts, believe this to be unachievable until summer 2010 (for SLAMRAAM) and 2011 (for Patriot PAC3) at the earliest. The UAE is still eager to obtain an overarching Air and Missile Defense system as soon as possible, along with numerous other supporting items to include the C2 systems mentioned.

¶5. (S) Although the FMS process ensures a "total package approach," post believes both FMS and DCS (where permitted) options and/or a hybrid option are all viable alternatives for military hardware and training. In addition, for all FMS equipment cases, the USG should be prepared to present a plan for support/follow-on support cases, as well as logistical/transportation cases and training cases (to include English language training estimated at several hundred thousand dollars for as many as 1000 UAE personnel) -- vital to the success of any sales program.

¶6. (S) Comment: Post offers above assessment in order to provide Department, DoD, and NSC a concise overview of what the UAE leadership has in mind for its military/security needs in the context of our regional security conversations with Gulf states over the next several weeks. This message should be read in conjunction with "Scenesetter for Visit to UAE by U/S Burns and U/S Levey" (septel). End Comment.

SISON